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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

held that the IRC must trace the pollutants from their source to
surface waters in order to state a claim under the CWA.
Finally, the court held that the affirmative defenses of diligent
prosecution and the doctrine of unclean hands were inapplicable for
the Bosmas.
Sarah A. Hubbard

United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. I., 2001) (holding
Krilich's ultra vires arguments, as well as other decree modification
arguments were insufficient to warrant a motion to vacate or modify a
consensual decree).
In 1992, the parties to the case entered into a consent decree
regarding violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Following this,
the United States contended that Krilich violated decree provisions on
part of the property subject to the decree. The government presented
the violation on stipulated and asserted facts. The trial court held that
Krilich violated decree mitigation plan deadlines on the Royce
Property. The court issued a penalty, which was upheld in a 1997
appeal. In 1998, Krilich moved to bar enforcement of the penalty
pursuant to Federal 'Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In so doing,
Krilich argued the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the mitigation
plan deadlines. The court denied relief. Krilich appealed, but the
court held that Krilich consented to the jurisdiction of the court by
entering the 1992 decree.
Krilich brought this motion in February 2001 on two bases. First,
Krilich argued that the Supreme Court opinion in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers warranted
vacation of the decree. Second, Krilich asserted that, in light of the
change of law represented in Solid Waste, the decree should have been
modified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (5) which
provides relief from judgment or order made in mistake.
In Solid Waste, the United States Supreme Court held the Army
Corps' "Migratory Bird Rule" unenforceable because it exceeded the
authority granted to the Corps under the CWA. Krilich contended
that Solid Waste made clear that none of the waters on the Royce
property were navigable waters subject to the CWA. Krilich argued
that because those waters were not under federal jurisdiction, the
United States had no authority to enter into the decree.
The court denied Krilich's motion to vacate the consent decree.
The argument that the decree was ultra vires, or void as beyond the
United States authority failed for four reasons. First, the government
agreement was not outside its authority because part of the property at
issue in the decree, the Sullivan Lake area, contains wetlands subject to
the CWA, even if Krilich's contentions regarding the Royce property
were correct. Second, if the government had gone beyond its
authority, that would not void the judgment as it would void a
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contract. Third, Krilich was bound by the stipulated facts used in
forming the decree, specifically the stipulation that the wetlands then
at issue were "waters of the United States." Finally, the court held that
the motion was not timely. Each of these four failures was adequate on
its own for the court to deny Krilich's motion to vacate the decree.
Krilich next argued for modification of the decree pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (5). This rule provides that a
judgment may be modified or vacated if "a priorjudgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."
The court held that this provision was not applicable here. The
provision was limited only to judgments that were the basis of issue or
claim preclusion, and not to cases relied upon as precedent.
Furthermore, the law had not been so changed by Solid Waste that
equity demanded the opening of the decree; Krilich's motion was
therefore denied.
Erika Delaney-Lew
Mississippi River Revival, Inc. v. Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul,
MN, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding a violation of the
Clean Water Act would compel no further action and do nothing to
redress injuries given the improbability of future violations, and a
statutory bar against recovering retroactive penalties in citizen suits).
In an effort to improve the natural environment of the Mississippi
River, a group of environmental organizations ("Organizations"), sued
the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis ("Cities"). The Organizations
alleged the Cities' discharge of storm water without a permit violated
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Cities owned storm drains, which
dated back to the nineteenth century and could not be shut off. The
drains prevented surface water from building up by directing rain and
melted snow through a series of channels into the Mississippi River.
Along the way, the water picked up pollutants such as lawn fertilizer,
petroleum byproducts, animal waste, and garbage, which in turn
impaired aesthetic and recreational interests on the Mississippi.
In order to comply with the CWA, the Cities needed a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit for their
discharges. The Cities submitted timely applications to the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency ("MPCA") for their NPDES permits in
November 1992. Despite federal regulations requiring action on such
application within one year, the MPCA did not take action for several
years. While the applications languished, the Organizations filed suit
against the Cities for discharging without a permit. The Organizations
sought both declaratory and injunctive relief along with the assessment
of civil penalties and an award of attorney's fees. However, before
judgment on that case, the MPCA issued the Cities NPDES permits
and, thus, rendered the Organizations' claim for injunctive relief

